Freedom

 Political freedom (sometimes called “liberty”) involves how we relate to constituted authority or power, especially when living in a state. It is therefore different from the philosophical concept of freedom; as in “free will” as distinct from determinism, fate, predestination, Pavlovian reactions etc).

Several questions emerge: are there different aspects of this political freedom; what restrictions may justifiably be placed on it, and why should a person be free anyway?

Two quite different types of freedom tend to crop up in political discussions, summarised under the general headings of “freedom to …” and “freedom from …” The latter concept will be discussed later; for the moment I am looking just at “freedom to”.

The simplest definition of “freedom to” is simply the ability to “do your own thing” without political restraint (often called by conservatives, “freedom of choice”). Thus, while I am not free to be an Olympic athlete (because I’m not strong, fast or skilled enough), I am free to attempt to become one, which would not be the case if I was subject to racial discrimination or some other politically-imposed ban.

It is immediately obvious that this freedom cannot be unlimited in an organised society. I am not free, for instance, to kill people I don’t like, and I am not free to drive my car wherever fancy takes me. Nor am I free to spread defamatory and malicious lies; though this raises the question of who decides that what I say is sufficiently false and malicious to merit being banned.

This reflects the fact that we are not isolated individuals. As Aristotle said, “Man is a political animal”: that is, we are herd-animals, like cattle or wolves, instinctively preferring to live in families or tribes, rather than solitaries like bears or tigers. This is why we become voluntary members of pseudo-families: clubs, gangs etc. We are also, from birth, involuntary members of states, and even when we become adults the only effective escape from this is to emigrate and join some other state. It is thus inevitable that any discussion of freedom will centre upon our relationship with the larger organisation of which we are members. (See the comment on Rousseau, below).

The aim of traditional liberalism has always been the maximum level of freedom compatible with life in an organised society. The ability to maximize my freedom was in the 18^th century often called “independence”: the ability to do my own thing and make my own choices without being coerced. But it was quite obvious that this ability is massively constrained by economic forces. Thus, a small child cannot be independent; being unable to survive without the help of adults. Even for adults, independence is subjected to the need to earn one’s living, which leads to dependence on the employer. Very few people are able to be fully independent; mostly rich people; and the richer you are, the more meaningful choices you are able to make. This led to the Marxists denouncing what they called “bourgeois liberty” as a fraud as far as most people were concerned. (Conservatives would counter with the argument that the desire for greater freedom of choice is what keeps people working hard to earn more money; whereas socialism makes everyone dependent on the state).

There is a famous quotation from John Gray, serving as an exam question: “The beggar is always freer than the conscript soldier, even though the latter may have more to eat”. The obvious point to be made here is that there is very little that the beggar can do to make use of his freedom, simply because he has no money; though the fact that the beggar prefers to sleep on the streets rather than be better housed and fed in a barracks or in prison does seem to suggest that he values this limited freedom.

Then there is the question of "Positive Freedom", as discussed by Isaiah Berlin and others. This usually means the ability to fulfil our potential without interference, either external or internal. In this sense, a drug addict or an alcoholic is not really free: he is a "slave" to his addiction, even though he knows it is bad for him. What can, or should, be done about this? Can the state intervene with his freedom to take heroin, or drink vodka, or gamble away all his money, "for his own good"? Mill attempts to deal with the problem by suggesting that addicts should be treated like children, and may have their freedom restricted. But this does not mean that drugs, or alcohol, or gambling, should be forbidden to everyone.
It is also very probable that children brought up in extreme poverty, or without access to education, will never be able to "fulfil their potential", either physical or intellectual; and it is really only the state that will be able to improve this situation. What then should the state do? (This will be discussed below). Marxists also pointed out that in the times before the Industrial Revolution, the overwhelming majority of the population must of necessity have been poverty-sticken peasants with virtually no opportunity for self-development; but that with massive increases in production, there should be no need for so many people to be trapped in poverty and ignorance: a socialist society would be able to unlock their potential.  

Why should we be free anyway? There are two answers to this: one is that we have a natural right to freedom, and the second is that individual freedom serves some useful purpose. The second has been discussed most fully in John Stuart Mill’s “On Liberty”.

Mill’s fundamental argument is that freedom is progressive. If I am free to make my own ideas and life-choices then I can develop as an individual: if I am not, then I remain in the position of a child. And Mill also believed there was clear evidence that societies which allowed the most individual freedom were those which progressed economically and technologically: authoritarian states lagged behind. (Mill was a mid-Victorian: the evidence from the 20^th century might be more ambiguous). Mill also introduced the notion of “social tyranny” and “tyranny of the majority”, realising that it is not only the state which restricts the individual’s freedom.

Conservatives, with their rather pessimistic view of human nature, tend to be suspicious of too much freedom. They fear “license”, in which freedom is abused by doing things that are harmful to society, or even to the doer; and therefore tend to favour a more paternalistic approach, in which freedom can be curtailed “for your own good”. Mill was suspicious of this, and tried to solve the problem with the formula of “liberty in all things which do not damage another person’s liberty”; but he admitted that freedom needed to be curtailed “for your own good” in the case of children, those with mental problems, and (more controversially) primitive peoples. Mill discusses at length three cases in which individual freedom might be restricted “for the public good”: alcohol, gambling and (rather tentatively) deviant sexual behaviour, coming to the general conclusion that what sane adults choose to do among themselves is no business of the state. He does not discuss two issues of importance today; drugs and firearms; because neither loomed large in the mid-Victorian consciousness. (I have outlined Mill’s views in an earlier essay).

   

 

Some philosophers have dismissed most of the above as a mere “liberty pile”: a list of the things you are permitted to do. Others have pointed out the unfairness of a greater freedom of choice being linked so closely with wealth; given that often the latter come merely through inheritance rather than from any personal merit. It is also argued that freedom of choice means little without a good standard of education, health and living standards, and that these cannot be achieved for everyone without the active involvement of the state. President Roosevelt’s famous “Four Freedoms” attempted to solve this dilemma: they were “Freedom of Speech”, “Freedom of Religion”, “Freedom from Want” and “Freedom from Fear”. A moment’s reflection will tell us that whereas the first two merely require that constituted authority leaves us alone, the third almost certainly involves the active participation of the state or of some other powerful body. As for the fourth: fear may be caused by a tyrannical state, but on the other hand a strong state apparatus may be needed to protect us from bandits.

The difficulty here is that state action to, for instance, raise living standards will almost certainly involve a restriction on individual liberty. Take education. It is obviously desirable that all children should receive as god a level of schooling as possible. (Apart from other considerations, having received an education undoubtedly increases the individual’s meaningful choices as regards a career) It is futile to hope that this can be achieved entirely by the operation of the free market. Schools are expensive, and the poorest parents will not be able to afford it: the state must intervene. This will mean raising taxes, and inspectors will have to be put in place to check that the taxpayers’ money is not being wasted or embezzled. Education will have to be made compulsory, and poorer parents who would prefer their children to be out earning money must not be allowed this freedom. Everything therefore points towards a state provision, or at least financing, of education. But Mill was worried at this prospect, since he did not see how any state could resist the temptation to use its schools to spread propaganda in children’s minds.

“Freedom from want” has presented problems for centuries. It has always been acknowledged that there are certain classes of unfortunates who are in need of help, either from individual charity or from local or national authorities: the blind or crippled, the very old and helpless, orphan children, etc. The real difficulty comes if help is needed by what used to be called “the able-bodied poor”: those who are physically capable of working, but for some reason or other do not seem to be able to support themselves and their families. What, if anything, should be done for them? Surely it cannot be right if it is more profitable not to work than to work? This problem has yet to be solved. But until recently, even in the most advanced countries, the people living in extreme poverty were very numerous. But the underlying assumption is; without a certain minimum standard of living, freedom is not really worth having: which takes us back to John Gray’s question, above.

There is an entirely different definition of freedom, found in the writings of Rousseau, and adapted by Hegel and the Marxists. It perhaps has its origins in the Jesuit prayer which refers to “Christ, whose service is perfect freedom”: in other words, you are only truly “free” when you are happily doing what you ought to be doing, and that to behave differently is not to be “free” but merely to be perverse: what a Marxist might dismiss as “bourgeois individualism”. Rousseau used the concept in his doctrine of the “General Will”: that to be truly free you should voluntarily subsume your personal desires in service to the collective; that if you refuse to do this you can be “forced to be free”. Bertrand Russell denounced Hegel’s adaptation of this as “freedom to obey the policeman”, and the Marxists took the line that if you opposed the Revolution you were perversely placing yourself on the wrong side of History. But such ideas have never really caught on in the Western liberal tradition, where the underlying assumption reamains that, in general, the ability to "do your own thing" is desirable in itself.  .