1938: the Munich Conference

After Hitler's successful Anschluss with Austria in March 1938, it was in retrospect obvious that his next target would be Czechoslovakia; a far stronger state which was, furthermore, allied with France and the Soviet Union. It was necessary for Hitler's expansionist plans that Czechoslovakia should be destroyed: he had described it as "an unsinkable aircraft carrier in the heart of Germany", and at the Hossbach meeting the previous autumn he had discussed various scenarios in which he could crush the Czechs without provoking a general European war. Soon afterwards he had directed his generals to give priority to "Plan Green": a pre-emptive strike against Czechoslovakia.
   Hitler's excuse for an attack would be the matter of the Sudetenland: the western fringe of Czechoslovakia.The frontier between Czechoslovakia and Germany was a natural geographical one, marked by a ring of mountains to provide a strong defensive position, rather than an ethnic one. The Sudetenland was inhabited mostly by ethnic Germans; though these people had previously been citizens of the Austrian Empire, not of the prewar German Reich. Hitler now instructed Konrad Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten Germans, to keep making demands which the government in Prague could not accept. However, Hitler had no specific plans at this stage, and on May 20th he told his generals that it was not his intention to attack Czechoslovakia in the immediate future.
   This patient approach, however, was to change abruptly. On May 20th, in response to rumours of an imminent German attack, the Czechs ordered partial mobilisation of their forces, and Britain and France warned Hitler of the dangers of war. Hitler was forced to deny that he had any aggressive intentions (which was in fact true at this stage) and felt humiliated. A week later he held another meeting with his generals, where he told them, "It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future". A new order was issued for "Plan Green", with a covering note that it go ahead before October 1st.

The Czechs were allied with France and Russia, though not with Britain; though if the French were dragged into war, Britain would certainly support them. But would the Czechs put up any resistance unless they were certain of help from their allies? and did the French really want to fight? and did the western powers really want the Russians to be involved? Hitler was well aware of these imponderables; he was not seeking a general European war, and he saw his political role as engineering a situation whereby he could destroy Czechoslovakia without other countries becoming involved. The early summer of 1938 accordingly featured psychological warfare, where German propaganda trumpeted the alleged sufferings of the Sudeten Germans, together with vague threats of military intervention on their behalf.

On the opposing side, the initiative was taken by the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain. Now in his seventies, he had not taken part in the First World War, but he was well aware of the immense suffering involved (his cousin and closest friend had been killed in action), and he foresaw that any future war would be even worse. He accordingly set himself the task of preserving peace. His policy of "appeasement" was based upon the acknowledgement that some German demands were justified, and ultimately that Hitler was a reasonable man who could be persuaded to refrain from war if a sensible deal could be negotiated.
   Accordingly, representatives of Chamberlain's government, far from urging the Czechs to stand firm and assuring them of British support, now instructed them to make concessions on the Sudetenland, and warned them that if they insisted on fighting over the issue, they would be on their own. The Czechs in their turn never did threaten to fight whatever the cost. The result was that on September 4th the Czech government finally conceded autonomy for the Sudetenland.

But of course this did not end the crisis, because Hitler was never interested in the Sudeten German issue except as a way of putting further pressure on the Czechs and their allies. Accordingly on September 12th he delivered a violent speech in which he made further demands and directly threatened war. 
   As the danger of war loomed, Chamberlain decided to take personal control of the situation, and accordingly on September 15th he flew to meet Hitler at the Fuhrer's mountain retreatof Berchtesgaden. We are so used to such meetings nowadays that we need to remind ourselves that it was the first time Chamberlain had ever boarded a plane,and the first time that face-to-face negotiations of this kind had ever been held. His message was to be that Britain had no objection in principle to the Sudentenland changing hands, provided it could be achieved without violence.  
   Hitler was delighted to receive him, and spoke warmly about his respect for Britain, but stressed the urgent need for the Sudeten "problem" to be solved speedily. Chamberlain returned to London, and the Czechs, under pressure from Britain and France, agreed to the secession of the Sudetenland. 
   With this agreement in his pocket, Chamberlain flew to a second meeting with Hitler on September 22nd, this time at Bad Godesberg. But to his astonishment and dismay, he was informed, "I am very sorry, but that is no longer of any use". What had happened in the interim was that Hitler had persuaded the Poles and Hungarians to make their own demands of the Czechs, and he told Chamberlain that he would be supporting them.  He now demanded that the Czechs must evacuate the Sudetenland by October 1st. 
  War now seemed imminent. Although Chamberlain was reluctant to stand firm, and his close adviror Sir Horace Wilson promised Hitler, "I will still try to make those Czechs sensible", the cabinet was divided. On September 25th decided that Britain could not recommend this new development to the Czechs, and promised to support France in the event of war. Meanwhile precautions against air raids began, gas masks were distributed and the fleet mobilised. It was at this stage that Chamberlain made his famous speech about "Quarrels in a faraway country about which we know nothing".
   Hitler's initial response was to become even more belligerent, but he quickly became aware of problems of his own. The German generals, it transpired, were alarmed at the prospect of a war on two fronts, and the German people decidedly unenthusiastic. Accordingly, when Mussolini suggested an international conference to solve the crisis, Hitler grundingly accepted. This became public in a dramatic scene in the House of Commons on September 28th: Chamberlain was speaking when a note was passed to him to say that Hitler had agreed to a conference. M.P.s met the announcement with wild cheering.

The famous Munich Conference took place on September 29th. In attendance were Hitler, Chamberlain, Mussolini and the French Prime Minister Daladier. The Czechs were not invited, and neither were the Russians, allied to the Czechs. The final agreement decreed that German troops would occupy the Sudetenland in stages, between October 1st and 10th. There would be plebiscites in disputed areas (which never took place) and the question of Polish and Hungarian demands on Czechoslovakia was left open. Britain and France gave an international guarantee to what was left of the Czech state. 
   Chamberlain returned home to a hero's welcome,as the man who had preserved peace in Europe. There was some violent criticism, notably from Churchill, but also a telegram from President Roosevelt that simply said, "Good man!" Chamberlain was accorded the rare privilege of an appearance with the Royal Family on the balcony of Buckingham Palace, before cheering crowds.
   In fact, the only change achieved was that Hitler now occupied the Sudetenland in stages, instead of all at once. Soon afterwards, the Poles took Teschen from what was left of the Czech state.
   A more sensible leader than Hitler (Bismarck, for instance) would have paused for thought after this bloodless triumph. But Hitler was by no means satisfied with the Much agreement: he was heard to say, "That fellow Chamberlain with his umbrella has ruined my entry into Prague!" He now directed his energies towards destroying the rump of Czechoslovakia, and preparing theGerman public for the coming of war. 
   We now know, of course, that six months later Hitler would use divisions between Czech and Slovaks to seize Prague and set up a Reich Protectorate of Bohemia, together with a collaborationaist government in Slovakia, which was now shorn of territories grabbed by Hungary. Deprived of their defensive frontier and much of their manufacturing industry by the Munich agreement, the Czechs could put up no resistance.
   However, this blatant aggression shook British confidence in Hitler's intentions, and when in the summer of 1939 Hitler put pressure on Poland over the city of Danzig, Britain and France gave clear commitments to Poland, and much to Hitler's surprise,  declared war on Germany in September. After the feeble performance at Munich, Hitler was not planning for this.

So in retrospect, all Chamberlain achieved was to delay the outbreak of war by twelve months. Was this a correct and justifiable course of action? My next blog post on the subject will be and examination and evaluation of Chamberlain's policy.